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Choosing a Cosmology Without Proof

Why a cosmos with intent is the more reasonable ground, and why its measured benefits arrive when it is held in common

Eron Falbo · October 2026

William James liked to put his listeners on a ledge in the Alps. A climber has worked himself into a spot where the only way out is a terrible leap. He has never made a jump like it and has no evidence that he can. If he trusts himself, the confidence steadies his legs and he lands. If fear wins, he hesitates until, exhausted and trembling, he launches himself in despair and misses his foothold. James told the story in “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879), and his point was that some beliefs help bring about the facts they are about.

A belief about the cosmos works differently. Believing the universe has a purpose does not give it one. What such a belief can change is the believer: what he works for, what he tells his children, what he stands on when his life goes wrong. A person is conscious, has to choose what to do next, and cannot know what the universe finally is or how his own story ends. For a creature in that position a cosmos with intent is the more reasonable ground to stand on. Most of what religious belief has been measured to do for people, it does when held in common with others, and whether it does more when taken up before the hard years come is still untested.

James’s Forced Option

James named the situation in “The Will to Believe”, a lecture to the philosophy clubs of Yale and Brown in 1896. An option is forced, he said, when “there is no standing place outside of the alternative.” The sceptic who waits for more light avoids one error, but in James’s words “we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve.”

There is a second reason the choice cannot be avoided. The site’s essay The Hierarchy of Belief places a person’s cosmology near the bottom of everything he believes, in the layer that every smaller belief is checked against, and for most people that layer was set in childhood by parents, school and the culture around them. The person who declines to choose is still running the answer he was handed.

James held that where an option is live, forced and momentous and the evidence cannot settle it, our “passional nature” may decide it. The licence covers only readers for whom the option is live, and the question here is a narrow one: among the answers the evidence leaves standing, which one does a person have most reason to adopt, and what result would show the choice was wrong?

Physicalism, Panpsychism and Idealism

The evidence leaves the ground open, though the sides are far from evenly matched. Physicalism has the closed causal chains of physics behind it, the tight dependence of every mental state on the brain, and three centuries of explanations that worked, and about 52 per cent of philosophers accepted or leaned toward it in the 2020 PhilPapers survey, against 32 per cent for the alternatives. The views that put consciousness first, such as Philip Goff’s panpsychism (Galileo’s Error, 2019) and Bernardo Kastrup’s idealism (The Idea of the World, 2019), are a small minority. Each side has an unsolved problem, and no experiment has decided between them.

A conscious ground could still be indifferent to every creature it appears in. One Mind, Many Vessels, the essay where this site declares the consciousness-first ground as its axiom, answers from the kabbalist Ramchal, who taught that the Infinite created in order to give. From outside there is only mechanism. From inside a life there is a giver and a gift. Nobody acts from outside, so the practical question is whether to take the inside reading as true, and that turns on what the belief does to the people who hold it.

Purpose, Mortality and Alzheimer’s

Viktor Frankl observed that prisoners with a reason to live outlasted those without one (Man’s Search for Meaning, 1946). Over fourteen years, among more than six thousand American adults, those with a stronger sense of purpose were less likely to die, even allowing for relationships and moods (Hill and Turiano, 2014). Patricia Boyle’s group in Chicago followed 951 older adults, and those at the 90th percentile of purpose were about two and a half times as likely to stay free of Alzheimer’s disease as those at the 10th (Boyle et al., 2010). These studies measure a person’s sense of his own purpose, and none of them asks what he believes about the cosmos.

How firmly a view is held matters as much as which view it is. Luke Galen and James Kloet found, among members of a church and of a secular group, that those certain there is a God and those certain there is none reported similar life satisfaction, and the uncertain the lowest (Galen and Kloet, 2011). The Belief page gives pistomechanics’ interpretation: beliefs make up the identity that acts, and doubt slows the passage from belief to action. The influence also runs back from action to belief, and some of the uncertain may be people in a bad year, doubting because of the trouble.

Atheists have been measured directly. A study of the 2008 General Social Survey found American atheists no more likely than believers to say life serves no purpose, and no more fatalistic (Speed, Coleman and Langston, 2018). Tatjana Schnell and William Keenan found that atheists averaged lower meaning in life than religious people but reported no more crises of meaning, and that among them those with broad commitments beyond themselves scored high (Schnell and Keenan, 2011). Comparing countries, Ed Diener, Louis Tay and David Myers found that the religious enjoy a well-being advantage where life is hard, and almost none in secure, wealthy nations (Diener, Tay and Myers, 2011).

Much of that advantage lives in the congregation. Chaeyoon Lim and Robert Putnam found that religious Americans are more satisfied with their lives because they attend services and make friends there, with little independent effect from private belief, though the friendships counted only for people with a strong religious identity (Lim and Putnam, 2010). Either cosmology can supply a firm purpose, but not on the same terms. Without intent, the purpose has to be built by the person who holds it, and those who never build it pay, as Schnell and Keenan’s atheists committed to little did. With intent, the purpose comes handed over with the ground, and a community of believers is one of the ways it is handed over.

Belief Held Before the Earthquake

Hardship is a place anyone can be sent. A secure nation is secure on average, and its people still receive diagnoses, bury children and lose businesses, without knowing which chapters are still ahead.

The Hierarchy of Belief holds that the bottom layer of what a person believes changes slowly, by sustained reinforcement, and that losing it with no replacement ready leaves a person defenceless. A belief adopted by decision also starts in the uncertain middle that does worst, and the Belief page holds that repetition is what deepens it. If both are right, a cosmology with intent is worth taking up in advance, the way a language is worth learning before the trip.

The strongest objection comes from the same evidence: people reach for belief when disaster strikes. Jeanet Sinding Bentzen found that people grow more religious where earthquakes are frequent and after a recent one, and pass it to their children (Bentzen, 2019). After the Christchurch earthquake of 2011, 8.6 per cent of the panel’s members in Canterbury took up a religion and 5.2 per cent gave one up, while elsewhere in New Zealand more left than joined (Sibley and Bulbulia, 2012). In the Indonesian crisis of 1997 and 1998, religious study rose most where the crisis cut deepest and helped households through it, most of all those less religious before (Chen, 2010). The Belief page itself counts conversion among the intense experiences that rewrite a deep belief quickly. If belief can be taken up when needed, holding it in advance buys nothing.

The answer is a claim still to be tested: a belief reached for in a crisis is thinner than one installed years earlier, and does less for its holder. The evidence so far is small and mixed. In the Christchurch data, neither converts nor long-standing believers rated their health better than non-believers afterward; those hit by the earthquake who lost their faith declined, which the authors read as a sign that keeping faith may aid recovery, though failing health may also have shaken the faith. Across 147 studies, religious people report slightly fewer symptoms of depression, more so under recent stress (Smith, McCullough and Poll, 2003), and in a small American cohort, religion’s importance measured before the COVID-19 pandemic predicted better adjustment during it (Svob et al., 2023). Neither of those two compares early believers with late ones. The two results that do compare them lean against the claim: the Christchurch converts matched the long-standing believers, and Chen’s late arrivals did well through the group’s material help.

Fate, Foreknowledge and the Person Who Acts

A second objection is older. If the cosmos has a plan, the outcome is settled, and choosing looks like theatre. Rabbi Akiva held both halves at once: “Everything is foreseen yet freedom of choice is granted” (Avot 3:15). The Stoics believed in fate outright and met the lazy argument: if you are fated to recover, you will recover whether or not you call the doctor. Chrysippus answered that the recovery is fated together with the calling of the doctor (Cicero, On Fate 28 to 30). Cleanthes wrote a prayer asking Zeus and destiny to lead him, admitting that if he refused he would make himself a wretch “and still must follow” (quoted by Epictetus, Handbook 53), and Seneca, putting the prayer into Latin, apparently added the line that became famous: the fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling (Letters 107.11).

Jenann Ismael reaches the same place without intent: a deterministic world still contains agents whose deliberation causes what they do (How Physics Makes Us Free, 2016). What intent adds is a reason the act matters beyond the person: in the Stoic picture the effort is wanted by the whole it belongs to.

Providence and Action: Stoics, Calvinists, Rabbis

The Stoics held that a providential reason orders the cosmos, and their ethics of action was practised by a freed slave, Epictetus, and an emperor, Marcus Aurelius. The rabbis taught that everything made in the six days still needs work (Genesis Rabbah 11:6). Max Weber argued that the Calvinists’ anxiety for signs that God had chosen them drove the methodical work of the early modern merchant (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1904 and 1905). Weber’s mechanism is disputed, and the leading alternative still starts with religion: Sascha Becker and Ludger Woessmann (2009) traced the Protestant advantage in nineteenth-century Prussia to literacy: a faith that put the Bible in every hand required every hand to read. Joseph Henrich (The WEIRDest People in the World, 2020) and Robert Nelson (Lutheranism and the Nordic Spirit of Social Democracy, 2017) extend such chains to the trusting societies of northern Europe, which religion helped build alongside wealth, good government and homogeneity (Delhey and Newton, 2005). The chains run through institutions, Bible reading and marriage law, as much as through belief in intent.

Since nearly every premodern society believed in intent, fatalist ones included, intent wins any historical count by default. The record shows only that the belief is compatible with intense effort, and goes with it when a person has a part to play and a community to play it in.

Spinoza and Marx: Action Without a Purposeful Cosmos

Spinoza shows that a person can act with force and deny intent. The appendix to Part I of his Ethics calls final causes human fictions, and he denied free will as well. He still built an ethics of active power on the necessity of Nature, and lived by it, at the price of a lifetime spent reasoning his way there.

Marxism is the harder case, because its materialism moved millions. It held that the world is matter and that history moves through stages toward communism, while leaving the person a part: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please” (Marx, 1852). Karl Löwith argued in Meaning in History (1949) that the scheme was messianism with the names changed, in which history became the ground that handed the purpose over. His reading concedes that the purpose need not come from a cosmos: history has served, and so have a nation and a cause. A nation can lose its war and a cause can win and end. A ground looks harder for events to take away, though not immune: in Canterbury after the earthquake more panel members took up a religion than gave one up, and some long-standing believers still lost theirs. Nobody has measured the same for a nation or a cause. The New Myth found the same borrowing of purpose at the scale of whole societies.

The Case for Intent, and Its Test

For a being who must choose without proof, a cosmos with intent is the more reasonable ground. James gives a reader for whom the option is live the right to adopt it, and the reason above favours it. A universe without intent leaves each person to build a purpose, as Spinoza did at great cost; the Marxists borrowed one from history, and others take theirs from a nation or a cause. A cosmos with intent hands the purpose over with the ground itself, through a community among other ways, and events seem to take that ground away less easily than they take a nation or a cause. The evidence does not show that the belief, held alone, does anything. Firm believers and firm atheists come out level, and most of the measured religious benefit arrives when the belief is held in common: Lim and Putnam’s life satisfaction came through the congregation, Chen’s insurance through the group, and Diener’s advantage in hard countries came with greater social support. None of these studies measured belief in intent as such. Intent at the ground postpones Diderot’s objection, that an imam could run Pascal’s wager too, since it names no creed; holding it with others brings the choice of creed back. Clifford’s charge that believing on insufficient evidence is always wrong remains its cost. The more reasonable ground, on this evidence, is one held in common, and the question of practice is left open here.

Three results would overturn the case, and each is enough on its own. The first concerns content and confidence. Among people who hold their view firmly, the overall comparison has already come out even, so the claim rests on hardship: believers in intent should report more purpose and control than convinced atheists as hardship grows, and if the gap does not widen, the claim fails. The seventh wave of the World Values Survey approximates the variables: belief in God (Q165), “an atheist” (Q173), “freedom of choice and control” (Q48), and going without food, medicine, income or shelter (Q51 to Q55). It asks nothing about purpose, which the International Social Survey Programme does.

The second concerns timing: if people who took up the belief after a shock fare as well as those who held it before, holding it in advance has no value. The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study can run this, though it measures religious affiliation rather than belief in intent.

The third concerns inheritance. If the trusting northern societies draw on capital that religion laid down, the drawdown should show across generations. Trust is still high: in the World Values Survey of 2017 to 2022, 72 per cent of Norwegians said most people can be trusted, against 37 per cent of Americans, though a snapshot cannot show a trend. Births show a drawdown of numbers: secular populations have fewer children than religious ones (Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?, 2010). The full test is whether Nordic trust holds for three more generations. A proxy can run now. Since 2002 the European Social Survey has asked whether “most people can be trusted”, on a scale from 0 to 10 (ppltrst), alongside year of birth, in Finland, Norway and Sweden every round. If younger, more secular cohorts trust as much as older ones, the drawdown argument weakens now. One Danish study already points that way: trust rose from 1979 to 2009, partly as younger generations replaced older ones (Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2014).

The published results divide three ways. In favour: the religious well-being advantage where life is hard (Diener, Tay and Myers), fewer depressive symptoms under stress (Smith, McCullough and Poll), better adjustment during the pandemic for those whose religion mattered beforehand (Svob et al.), and the decline of those who lost their faith after the Christchurch earthquake. Against: atheists are no more fatalistic, secure countries erase the religious advantage, the Christchurch converts matched the long-standing believers, and Chen’s late arrivals did well; against the drawdown argument, Danish trust has risen across generations. Untested: the hardship and timing tests.

The Torah put the same choice to a people about to cross a river, with the consequences as its only argument: “I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life” (Deuteronomy 30:19).